Current
Scenario> Problems in Police Force> Design defects in Indian Police
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Unwarranted external interference
As mentioned earlier there
are a certain scope for external interference in the police force today, this
is particular true in the field of crime investigation, promotions and
transfers. The following discussion will focus on these problems and the
suggested solutions will be presented later in this section.
Unwarranted political
interference in crime investigation
In theory, the police force
functions independently from the executive and is according to the Indian
constitution accountable to the state government. In reality, police personnel
are subjected to frequent and arbitrary transfers and they are exposed to
unwarranted external pressure. The reasons for this pressure are two fold:
corruption and political patronage of criminals.
Financial reasons
The Chief Minster (CM) is
dependent on the support of the legislators. This has created a scope for the
legislators to pressurise the CM (in exchange for their support) to transfer,
promote and appoint certain police officers at various levels. Leading to the
transfer of unwanted and inconvenient police officers who can get transferred to
a less attractive post or district, while those who are easily influenced can be
posted to 'rewarding' or powerful positions. In return for this service these
legislators get payments from the involved police officers. This money can be
understood to be a return for these legislators, on the massive investments made
by them during elections. This is the purely monetary, totally illegitimate,
side of political interference. In addition, police officials or politicians may
be bribed for suppressing or distorting evidence and to undermine prosecution of
a criminal case.
Where does the scope for
political interference arise?
In the Indian political
system, the voters elect the Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA) and the MLAs
vote for their Chief Minister (CM). In theory, the CM and his/her government is
accountable to the citizens. But in reality, the CM is accountable primarily to
the MLAs because it is their support that keeps him/her in office.
Again, in theory, the
government headed by the CM alone decides all appointments, transfers and
promotions of police officers in a state. But again reality is different. The
MLAs (well aware of the government's dependence on their support for survival)
can and actually do influence the appointments, transfers and promotions of
individual officers, to their benefit.
Huge amounts of money change
hands during this process, where chosen officers are posted in and disfavoured
officers are shunted out to less 'rewarding' posts. Hence creating the scope for
political interference.
Personal reasons
Over the last thirty years,
candidates to the state legislature first took the help from less legitimate
elements to get elected; and now, increasingly, these elements themselves are
getting elected. This has led to known criminals being elected to the state
legislature. The police personnel nce again get pressured from the
legislators for an investigative officer to neglect or close an ongoing
investigation. The police investigation officers as well as the public
prosecutors are under tremendous pressure not to present a strong case in
the courts. This is the more dangerous side of political interference, where
rule of law and the existence of democratic institutions are being threatened.
Because of the two reasons
stated above, it is common that the Chief of Police is changed to suit the
legislators whenever a new government is elected. The changes do not merely
affect the top levels, but can go all the way down to the Station House
Officer, to please the new regime.
To survive in such a
system, police personnel feel compelled to surrender to political influence in
their work. This in turn gravely affects the police work, and specifically the
criminal investigations. A police investigator, who is one day leading an
investigation, can find him/herself transferred the next day to conduct traffic,
if he or she resists the pressure of a local MLA.
Appointments, transfers and
promotions
In the present police force,
appointments, transfers and promotion are mostly based on subjective opinions.
Promotion to higher positions directly involves the executive, while transfers
and postings are vested in the hands of higher ranked police officer and applied
to all levels. Even here the political executive has an important say. A new
government usually appoints, transfers and promotes policemen they know are
loyal to them.
The same applies to the
appointments of prosecutors. In theory, the District Magistrate shall prepare a
panel of names of persons that are fit to be prosecutors for the district. The
list shall be put forward by the Magistrate and a Judge shall appoint who he or
she seems to be fit. In practice, it is different. It happens that the state
government first recommends names to the Magistrate, which he puts on the panel
and hands it back. The listing of the names is based on personal loyalties and
political affiliations, rather than on merits and skills.
The result of this is a
police force and a prosecution system that rather serve the politicians than the
public. Hence the police force cannot function independently under this system.
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